We sort out confounding factors in the empirical link between bilateral migration and trade. Using newly available panel data on developing countries' diaspora to rich OECD nations in a theory-grounded gravity model, we uncover a robust, causal pro-trade effect.
Introduction
In the perfect-competition aggregate production function framework emigration triggers a static welfare loss for remaining individuals as the marginal productivity of immobile complementary factors declines. Skill-biased emigration (a brain drain) may add a dynamic loss if the source country's average human capital falls. Docquier and Marfouk (2006) show that the total stock of migrants from poor Southern countries in the rich OECD has grown from about 19 million people in 1990 to 31 million in 2000. Moreover, the average rate of high-skilled emigration has been 6.6 percent in 1990 and 7.2 in 2000, with higher numbers for least-developed countries.
Theory papers discuss channels which may mitigate this brain drain. Besides remittances, migration prospects may increase the incentives for higher education, so that average human capital in the non-migrant population may actually rise. Moreover, a diaspora may improve access to foreign markets, thereby encouraging international trade or investment. However, Lucas (2006) concludes that "the empirical evidence on each of these ... channels remains highly controversial. The most systematic portion of this evidence looks at the links between migration and trade, though difficulties eliminating spurious associations remain" (p. 373).
Spurious association arises due to confounding factors that determine both, the volume of bilateral trade and the bilateral stock of migrants. For example, cultural proximity matters for bilateral trade volumes, but may also affect emigration rates. Similar considerations apply for the ease of geographical mobility. If unobserved components of cultural and geographical proximity positively affect migration, OLS estimates would suffer from endogeneity bias and overestimate the true effect of migration on trade.
We include the bilateral stock of migrants into a theory-grounded gravity equation. Recent data on the stock of emigrants from poor sending countries comes from Docquier and Marfouk.
The data has a time dimension and distinguishes between three different educational classes.
The panel nature of the data allows to account for unobserved heterogeneity by differencing out unobserved country-pair specific characteristics. Baier and Bergstrand (2007) have recently shown the advantages of this approach in a comparable gravity context. Moreover, we can perform a regression-based test for strict exogeneity (Wooldridge, 2002 ).
We report three major results. First, failing to control for unobserved heterogeneity indeed leads to overestimation. Second, there is, nevertheless, a statistically and economically significant causal effect of migration on trade. Third, low-and high-skilled migrants strongly boost bilateral trade by comparable quantities while medium-skilled migration does not seem to matter. So far, empirical gravity studies have typically focused on a single anchor country, see the survey of Wagner et al. (2002) . Dunlevy (2006) and Bandyopadhyay et al. (2008) document a pro-trade effect of migration on the exports of US states. Kugler and Rapoport (2007) analyze how emigration into the US fosters capital formation; Docquier and Lodigiani (2006) extend this exercise to a cross-section of host countries. The two latter papers use the same data than ours; however, we seem to be the first to exploit the temporal and bilateral dimensions of the data in a theory-grounded South-North gravity model.
Econometric specification
We augment the theory-based gravity framework described in Feenstra (2004) with the bilateral stocks of migrants. We strive to explain the volume of trade T snt between a (poor) Southern sending country, s, and a (rich) Northern receiving country, n, at time t ∈ {1990, 2000}. We investigate the effect of M IG k snt , the stock of foreign-born residents from s in n by education k (k ∈ {l, m, h}, l: low-skilled, m: medium-skilled, and h: high-skilled).
Our gravity equation is
where the vector PROX sn collects indicators of cultural and geographical proximity, and POL snt measures time-variant bilateral trade policy. We include a comprehensive set of countryand-time effects ν st and ν nt to control for all source and destination specific determinants, in particular for multilateral resistance terms. 1 We impose the error structure ε snt = c sn + u snt , where c sn is a dyad-effect and u snt the usual idiosyncratic error term. In the presence of unobserved confounding factors explanatory variables will be correlated with the error term u snt so that OLS is invalid. Following Baier and Bergstrand, we difference equation (1) to eliminate c sn . As suggested by Wooldridge (p. 285), in a two-period framework we can test whether the differenced version of (1) satisfies the assumption of strict exogeneity E (∆u sn |∆X sn ) = 0, where ∆X sn is the vector of first differences of all explanatory variables. We include the stocks of foreign-born residents in the differenced version of equation (1) and perform an F-test for joint significance. Failing to reject the null would signal that differencing has indeed solved the endogeneity concern.
Data and empirical results
We use bilateral data on international migration by education for the years 1990 and 2000 collected by Docquier and Marfouk. The trade data has been assembled and provided by Feenstra et al. (2005) . 2 We focus on a balanced panel of low-income Southern sending countries and high-income Northern receiving countries. 3 Our sample covers more than 92 percent of total South-North migration.
Geographical (distance, contiguity) and cultural covariates (common language, colonial ties)
are taken from the CEPII data base. We include dummies for non-reciprocal preferential trade arrangements (N R P T A snt ), preferential trade arrangements (P T A snt ), free trade agreements, and customs unions (F T A snt ), and the Euro-zone (EU RO snt ). This data comes from Baier and Bergstrand. Table 1 presents pooled OLS estimations of equation (1). Odd numbered columns present the most parsimonious model; even numbered columns include covariates related to cultural 2 The dependent variable is the geometric average of trade flows between the two countries; see Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) . 3 A country with per capita GDP above the 80th quantile is classified North and South else. This strategy yields the same classification for 1990 and 2000, except for Greece. There is no data for countries from the former USSR, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. The obtained sample is similar to that used by Beine et al. (2008) . We average the bilateral trade data over the periods 1988-1990 and 1998-2000 to reduce measurement error and increase data availability. This has no importance for our results. The Feenstra et al. data does not distinguish between missing and zero trade flows. Hence, we cannot empirically distinguish between the intensive and the extensive margin of trade.
proximity. Columns (1) and (2) disallow for elasticities to vary across educational classes.
Columns (3) to (8) estimate the pro-trade effect of single educational groups in isolation, while columns (9) and (10) report the unconstrained version of (1).
Across all specifications, the elasticity of trade volumes with respect to distance is close to unity. While non-reciprocal trade agreements seem to matter, preferential trade arrangements and free trade agreements fail to show statistical significance. These are standard results which nicely replicate Baier and Bergstrand.
Concerning the link between migration and trade we find the following: First, there is a strong positive association between the total bilateral stock of migrants and bilateral trade. The effect remains when considering migrants at different educational levels, see columns (3), (5), and (7). Second, in column (9), where migration of all skill groups is accounted for, we find that the pro-trade elasticity of high-skilled workers is almost four times bigger than that of low-skilled workers. Surprisingly, conditional on the emigration of other skill classes, mediumskilled individuals seem to reduce bilateral trade volumes. Third, including controls for cultural proximity almost reduces the effects by half; compare odd and even numbered columns. Hence, ignoring cultural proximity as a common determinant of both trade and migration leads to upward biases estimates. However, the unexpected negative effect of medium-skilled migrants remains, see Column (10) . While these results go beyond the literature in showing the effect of skill structure in a fairly comprehensive sample of North-South trade relations, they may still suffer from endogeneity bias. Table 2 presents our preferred specification where confounding factors are differenced out.
It also presents the outcome of a regression-based F-test on strict exogeneity. Since all p-values are above 0.1, we cannot reject strict exogeneity in all specifications at conventional levels of significance. Hence, we interpret our estimates as the causal effect of migration on trade.
The following results stand out. First, the positive link between migration and trade remains intact for the total stock of migrants as well as for low-and high-skilled migrants, but turns insignificant for medium-skilled migrants; see columns (1) to (4) . Second, comparing even numbered columns of Table 1 (which include additional measures of cultural proximity) and results presented in Table 2 , we find that OLS always overestimates the effect of migration on trade, signaling the presence of endogeneity bias. However, that bias is much smaller when the OLS model includes measures of cultural proximity than when it does not. Third, column (5) shows that the partial effect of medium-skilled migrants on trade is now statistically insignificant compared to the corresponding OLS estimates in column (9)- (10) of Table 1 . Here, OLS actually seems to underestimate the true effect. While the results in column (5) suggest that the skillcomposition of migration does matter -since medium-skilled migrants do not appear to promote trade -we cannot formally reject the hypothesis that the pro-trade elasticity of low-skilled migrants equals the one of high-skilled.
We conclude with three remarks. First, the pro-trade effect of migration is quantitatively important. A one-percent increase of the bilateral stock of migrants raises bilateral trade by 0.11 percent (column (1), Table 2 ). Since the mean bilateral migrant population in our sample is 27,000 persons and the mean North-South trade volume is 665 mio dollar in year 2000, our estimate implies that one additional migrant creates about 2,700 dollar in additional trade. 4 Hence, the pro-trade effect of emigration is a powerful driver in overturning welfare losses from emigration. Second, medium-skilled migrants do not foster trade. This may have to do with the low overlap between educational classes and occupational groups: medium-skilled workers may be predominantly employed in the non-tradeable sector. Moreover, the skill-distribution of migrants is often bi-modular, with relatively little mass on medium-skilled workers. Third, there are two interesting avenues for further research. Our empirical strategy provides consistent estimates of the average elasticity of migration on trade (see Feenstra) , leaving the analysis of potential systematic differences across country pairs to future work. Moreover, one would have to establish that a diaspora creates trade not exclusively through its effect on the preferences of the representative consumer in the receiving country, but also through lower trade costs. This would complete the case that the pro-trade effect of a diaspora can mitigate or even overturn the emigration loss. 
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Notes: N R P T A: non-reciprocal preferential trade arrangements, P T A: preferential trade arrangements, F T A: free trade agreements, customs unions, EU RO: common use of the Euro. All variables in logs, except for dummies. Balanced sample of 1195 dyads. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. All regressions include country-and-time effects, and a constant. 
A Appendix
The appendix contains a detailed description of the data sources, along with a complete list of countries included, summary statistics, and results from regressions where we restrict our sample to countries which classify migrations by the foreign-born concept.
Data sources
Stock of foreign-born residents by educational level : Docquier and Marfouk (2006) siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRES/Resources/Dataset BD DocquierMarfouk.xls Bilateral trade flows: NBER-United Nations trade data, Feenstra et al. (2005) www.internationaldata.org/data/undata/undata. Trade flows in millions of dollar. N R P T A: non-reciprocal preferential trade arrangements, P T A: preferential trade arrangements, F T A: free trade agreements, customs unions, and common markets, EU RO: common use of the Euro. Results from our restricted sample
Countries included -North

ISO
The classification of immigrants is not harmonized across OECD countries. Germany, Greece, Italy, and Japan report migrants by the concept of citizenship rather than by country of birth. Thus, the respective naturalization policies may influence our results. Our destination-and-time effects perfectly control for non-discriminatory naturalization policies. However, they do not suffice to capture discriminatory policies.
We restrict our sample to countries which employ the foreign-born concept, and repeat our empirical exercise. Tables A and B respond to Tables 1 and 2 in the paper, and present the results of the pooled OLS regressions and our differenced model, respectively. The results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar, though the negative elasticity of medium-skilled migrants remains in our preferred specification, see column (5) of Table B . N R P T A: non-reciprocal preferential trade arrangements, P T A: preferential trade arrangements, F T A: free trade agreements, customs unions, and common markets, EU RO: common use of the Euro. All variables in logs, except for dummies. Sample restricted to countries which classify migrants by country of birth. Balanced sample of 1102 country pairs. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. All regressions include comprehensive sets of country-and-time effects for source and destination, and a constant (all not shown). NR PTA: non-reciprocal preferential trade arrangements, PTA: preferential trade arrangements, FTA: free trade agreements, customs unions, and common markets, EURO: common use of the Euro. All variables in logs, except for dummies. Sample restricted to countries which classify migrants by country of birth. Balanced sample of 1102 country pairs. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. All regressions include comprehensive sets of country effects for source and destination, and a constant (all not shown). In all specifications, we cannot reject strict exogeneity of the included migration variables at 5 percent level of significance; see Wooldridge (2002, p. 285 ) for a detailed discussion of the test, and Baier and Bergstrand (2007) for a recent application. According to the Wald test,β h andβ l are not statistically different.
